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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. ] 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 2033 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court, J. Dennis Frederick presiding, 
(1) Commit reversible error in adopting the recomend 
ations of Domestic Relations Commissioner (with modifications) 
without permitting defendant/appellant an evidentiary hearing in 
this matter? 
(2) Are the adopted recommendations erroneous in any 
event? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a post-judgment proceeding pursuant to an Order 
to Show Cause following a Divorce Decree seeking to reduce to 
judgment alleged "mortgage payments" claimed by plaintiff to be 
owing to her by defendant pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
(R.131-135) The matter was presented to Commissioner Sandra 
Peuler, Domestic Relations Commissioner for the Third District 
Court, on August 9, 1984, and reduced by her to a recommendation 
in writing in a Minute Entry (R.137)(Addendum, page 22) on which 
she wrote, among other things, "Deft did not accept 
recommendation." As indicated in the transcript of that hearing 
(R.230-242), the matter was submitted to Commissioner Peuler on 
proffers from respective counsel as is usually the case in her 
courtroom. No actual evidence was adduced, admitted or permitted. 
On October 1, 1984, the matter came before District 
Court Judge J. Dennis Frederick, who ruled that the defendant 
must be deemed to have consented to the entry of an order in 
conformance with the Commissioner's recommendation because 
defendant had failed to comply with Judge Frederick's interpre-
tation of Rule 8(d) of the local Rules of the District Court. 
(R.148) In the Order (Addendum, page 26) just noted, Judge 
Frederick also reduced the alleged mortgage payments to a dollar 
certain amount and entered judgment in the sum of $8,411, together 
with interest, even though he permitted no evidence to be adduced 
at the hearing on October 1 as to liability or amount claimed, and 
although Commissioner Peuler had made no finding on the amount 
owing (if any) in her recommendation or in the transcript of the 
hearing above referred to. Plaintiff's entitlement to, and the 
amount of any such judgment are both contested issues in this 
proceeding. 
In addition, Judge Frederick awarded a $150 attorney's 
fee to the plaintiff for the benefit of her attorney even though, 
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as noted above, no evidentiary basis for such award occurred 
before Judge Frederick, nor was there any recommendation for 
an attorney's fee in Commissioner Peuler's Minute Entry. 
Defendant filed timely objections to the judgment of 
the District Court (R.151-155) which were argued before Judge 
Frederick on November 19, 1984, and an Order Denying the 
Objections was entered by the Court November 20, 1984, (R-
163)(Addendum, page 29) from which the defendant timely prosecuted 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant/defendant will be referred to hereinafter 
as "defendant," and respondent/plaintiff will be referred to 
hereinafter as "plaintiff." 
A Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled 
matter June 23, 1981, in which the plaintiff was awarded the 
parties1 residence at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which was encumbered by two mortgages. Defendant was awarded two 
rental properties located respectively at 195 Allen Street, 
Midvale, Utah, and 1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming, each of which was 
also heavily mortgaged. (R.115-120) 
Paragraph 3 of the Decree provides: 
"Plaintiff is hereby awarded the residence of the 
parties at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
first mortgage on said residence property with Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan, having a balance of 
approximately Fifty-two thousand eight hundred dollars, 
($52,800.00), and monthly payments of approximately Five 
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hundred seventy-eight dollars, ($578.00), shall be paid 
by defendant. The second mortgage on said residence 
with Deseret Federal Savings and Loan, having an 
approximate balance of Fourteen thousand dollars 
($14,000.00), and monthly payments of approximately One 
hundred eighty-one dollars ($181.00), shall be paid by 
plaintiff." 
Paragraph 4 continues: 
"Defendant is hereby awarded the rental properties 
of the parties at 195 Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, and 
1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming, subject to and contingent 
upon plaintiff being relieved of all obligations for 
payment of any loans secured by said rental properties, 
provided that defendant shall execute and deliver to 
plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed for the benefit of 
plaintiff in such amount as shall be required to pay the 
first mortgage on the plaintiff's residence, together 
with all costs and attorneys fees to be incurred in 
recovering the amounts owing and in paying the balance 
owed on the first mortgage on plaintiff's residence. 
Said mortgage or trust deed shall be against the rental 
properties at 1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming." 
On June 30, 1982, plaintiff sold the family home on a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, having previously moved to St. 
George, Utah, with the minor children of the parties. (See 
"Notice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract" recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder June 29, 1982, with the 
contract attached thereto dated June 30, 1982, in the Addendum to 
this Brief, pages 12 to 15.) Plaintiff remarried on May 18, 1983, 
prior to any alleged delinquency in the said mortgage payments. 
(Answers to Interrogatories, Addendum to this Brief, page 7). 
Thereafter on August 9, 1984, the plaintiff brought an 
Order to Show Cause proceeding (Addendum, page 17) before Third 
District Court Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra Peuler 
dealing with the first mortgage on the home referred to above. At 
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that hearing before Commissioner Peuler each side made proffers, 
but no evidence was permitted or received. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, Commissioner Peuler made a recommendation as set 
forth on Exhibit A to Commissioner Peulerfs Affidavit annexed to 
defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition filed with this court 
November 14, 1984, and reproduced in the Addendum to this Brief at 
page 11. At the same time that the decision was announced, the 
defendant's counsel stated into the record in open court that 
defendant did not accept the said decision, and that objection was 
duly noted on the said Minute Entry by Commissioner Peuler. 
(R.137)(Addendum, page 11) In preparation for an evidentiary 
hearing before Judge Frederick, the defendant thereafter on August 
14, 1984, served Interrogatories upon the plaintiff for the 
purpose of ascertaining the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the sale of the home of the parties and the disposition of the 
mortgage on said home, the payment of which was the subject of 
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause. 
The said Interrogatories were answered by plaintiff 
without objection on or about September 10, 1984. A copy of those 
Answers to Interrogatories is included in the Addendum to this 
Brief at pages 3 to 8. (Certificate of Service of Interrogatories 
is at page 21 and Certificate of Service of Answers to Interroga-
tories is at page 25 of the Addendum.) 
Thereafter counsel for defendant sent a notice to 
counsel for plaintiff which stated: 
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"TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY, AARON ALMA NELSON: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Order to Show Cause 
heard by Commissioner Sandra Peuler on August 9, 1984f 
has been referred to the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
judge of the above-entitled court, and is set for 
hearing on Monday, September 10, 1984, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m. 
DATED the 21st day of August, 1984. 
/s/ 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorney for Defendant" 
(R.138 and Addendum Page 23) 
The matter was actually heard by Judge Frederick on 
October 1, 1984, at which time plaintiff's attorney made a motion 
that Judge Frederick adopt the Commissioner's findings and to 
disallow defendant an evidentiary hearing on the merits for the 
purported reason that defendant had not complied with Rule 8(d) of 
the Rules of Procedure in the Third District Court. This is the 
first time such an issue had ever been raised, plaintiff's counsel 
having answered the said Interrogatories without objection after 
the hearing before Commissioner Peuler. Defendant resisted said 
motion, but the Court granted the motion of the plaintiff to 
disallow defendant a hearing on the merits and granted plaintiff's 
motion to adopt the findings of the Commissioner without hearing. 
Consequently no evidentiary hearing was conducted by Judge 
Frederick then or at any time. Written Judgment was entered 
October 19, 1984. 
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(R.147-150) 
Reference to additional facts located in the record will 
be made in the course of argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Defendant complied with Rule 8(d) of the Rules 
of the Third Judicial District Court: Rule 8(d) provides that if 
a party is not satisfied with a recommendation by the 
Commissioner, that he give notice to the Commissioner and opposing 
counsel within five days that the recommendation is rejected. The 
rule does not require such notice to be in writing. Counsel for 
defendant notified the Commissioner and opposing counsel in open 
court that the recommendation of the Commissioner was rejected, 
and that rejection was noted in the Commissioner's own Memorandum 
Decision. Furthermore, counsel for plaintiff thereafter answered 
Interrogatories served by counsel for the defendantf showing that 
he had fully understood that the Commissioner's recommendation had 
been rejected and that a hearing before the judge was required. 
POINT II. Plaintiff's counsel had actual or 
constructive notice, or both, of defendant's refusal to accept 
Commissioner Peuler's recommendation: Within five days of the 
hearing by Commissioner Peuler, counsel for defendant served 
Interrogatories upon counsel for the plaintiff. The only purpose 
for such Interrogatories could be that counsel for defendant had 
rejected the Commissioner's recommendation, and the 
Interrogatories themselves constituted actual, constructive or 
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implied notice of rejection, which, in keeping with liberal 
construction of the rules (Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), 
fulfill any notice requirements in any event. 
POINT III. At the initial hearing Commissioner Peuler 
herself stated that if there were appropriate evidence that 
plaintiff was no longer bound on the mortgage in question, she 
might be persuaded to rule otherwise, and in the same ruling from 
the bench Commissioner Peuler herself noted that a further 
evidentiary hearing appeared to be necessary in this matter: 
Commissioner Peuler stated that she might well be persuaded to 
reverse her ruling if plaintiff had relieved herself of the 
mortgage obligation (which in fact turned out to be the case, but 
which counsel for plaintiff did not admit in his proffer before 
Commissioner Peuler), and Commissioner Peuler actually stated that 
she herself thought that a further evidentiary hearing would be 
required. 
POINT IV. Judge Frederick's order miscontrued Rule 8(d) 
and its implementation by Commissioner Peuler as reflected in her 
Affidavit: At the hearing before Judge Frederick, counsel for the 
plaintiff informed the Court that Rule 8 required that the 
rejection be in writing. Judge Frederick apparently accepted that 
representation, although Rule 8(d) does not make any requirement 
as to a written rejection, and the notation in Commissioner 
Peulerfs Minute Entry would in any event satisfy any requirement 
for a written rejection. Finally, counsel for plaintiff has 
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nowhere asserted that he was in anywise prejudiced by the form of 
the rejection. 
POINT V. Judge Frederick's Judgment without allowing an 
evidentiary hearing exceeds and modifies the recommendation of 
Commissioner Peuler: At the hearing before Judge Frederick he 
denied defendant evidentiary hearing and stated that he was 
adopting the Commissioner's recommendation. Nevertheless, he went 
beyond the Commissioner's recommendation in determining without 
evidence the amount of the debt owed and also in awarding an 
attorney's fee. He further went on to require that defendant give 
plaintiff a mortgage to secure the very debt which plaintiff had 
relieved herself of and upon which subject Commissioner Peuler 
declined to make any ruling on the basis that there was not 
sufficient evidence before her to do so. 
POINT VI. There is, even in the abbreviated record 
before this court, sufficient factual material that would suggest 
that the opposite result would have been reached by the District 
Court had there been an evidentiary hearing and requires, at the 
very least, that in fairness and equity an evidentiary hearing 
should be ordered by this Court: Defendant is entitled in equity 
and good conscience to an evidentiary hearing upon the facts of 
this case. 
POINT VII. The recommendations of Commissioner Peuler 
as adopted by Judge Frederick are erroneous in any event: The 
Order that defendant make monthly intallment payments to the 
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holder of the first mortgage on the residence awarded to the 
plaintiff would appear to be in the nature of support to plaintiff 
and was accordingly an award in the nature of alimony, which award 
would terminate as soon as plaintiff was relieved from payment of 
the debt and a third party had assumed itf or in any event would 
terminate upon the remarriage of the plaintiff, which remarriage 
occurred prior to the accrual of any of the arrears claimed by the 
plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH RULE 8(d) OF THE RULES 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. 
Rule 8(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Third 
Judicial District Court provides: 
"Any party objecting to the recommended order or 
seeking further hearing before the assigned judge shall, 
within five (5) days of entry of the commissioner's 
recommendations, provide notice to the commissioner's 
office and opposing counsel that the recommended order 
is not acceptable or that further hearing is desired. 
The commissioner shall then refer the matter to the 
assigned judge for further hearing, conference or trial. 
If no objection or request for further hearing is made 
within five (5) days, said party shall be deemed to have 
consented to entry of an order in conformance with the 
commissioner's recommendation." 
(The entire text of Rules 6 through 10 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Third District Court are included in the Addendum to this 
Brief at pages 1 and 2.) 
The aforesaid affidavit of Commissioner Peuler submitted 
to this Court and reproduced in the Addendum, pages 9 to 11, says: 
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"That the usage in her courtroom, both before and since 
the adoption of the Rules of Procedure for the Third 
District Court, and particularly as it relates to Rule 
8(d), was and is that if a party in a domestic relations 
matter did not agree or concur with said commissioner's 
recommended order, the party could so inform the court 
at the time; or should such party wish additional time 
for deliberation before deciding, could do so at any 
time within five (5) days from the date of the hearing. 
Such notice or communication of disagreement or 
nonconcurrence has never been required by Commissioner 
Peuler to be submitted in writing. Frequently the 
nonconcurrence was announced in open court at the time 
the recommended order was announced, in which case such 
nonconcurrence would be noted in the minute entry for 
that date. Such a disagreement or nonconcurrence on the 
part of the defendant in the case of Wiscombe v. 
Wiscombe was made by counsel in open court and so noted 
on Commissioner Peulerfs minute entry in that matter 
dated August 9, 1984." (Emphasis added.)(Addendum, pages 
9 and 10) 
That Minute Entry (R.137)(Addendum, page 11 and page 22) 
says: 
"1. As long as pltf is obligated on mortgage 
payments, deft is obligated too. 
"2. Pltf is entitled to judgments he hasn't made 
on that (sic). 
"3. Defendant is obligated to do what divorce 
decree required him to do. 
"Deft did not accept recommendation." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the transcript of the hearing, which is not complete 
and has several "(inaudible)" notes throughout (which, the 
undersigned supposes was because it was transcribed from a tape 
recording of the proceedings since there is no shorthand reporter 
assigned to Commissioner Peuler), there appears the following: 
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Following the Commissioner's announcing of her ruling in 
the matter, she asked for questions of counsel. Plaintiff's 
attorney raised a point and then the undersigned made a statement 
which is terminated with an '(inaudible).' (R.240) The court then 
continued 
"Counsel, I'm not going to entertain further argu-
ments. I've heard everything you had to say and I think 
the requirements of the decree need to be carried out. 
"I'll ask you to discuss the recommendation with 
your clients and let me know if you need a further 
setting. For your information the case has been 
appointed to Judge Frederick." 
The undersigned then responded "Frederick? Thank you." 
"The Court: 'Thank you.'" (R.241) 
The undersigned communicated to the Commissioner his 
client's unwillingness to accept her recommendation, and this was 
either "inaudible," not picked up by the machine at all, or the 
recording machine was prematurely turned off, or it became mixed 
up with a subsequent case. In any event, the Commissioner herself 
heard that communication made in open court by defendant's counsel 
and noted it in the Minute Entry quoted above. 
While there was no stenographic transcription of the 
hearing thereafter in front of Judge Frederick, the undersigned 
assert to this Court that counsel for plaintiff in that argument 
insisted that refusal to accept the Commissioner's recommendation 
had to be submitted in writing within the five-day time period. 
When the matter was submitted to this Court on the Motion for 
Summary Disposition, plaintiff's counsel in his Objections 
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abandons that position and no longer insists that it "must be in 
writing," but only asserts now that somehow he was not given 
actual notice of the defendant's refusal to accept the 
Commissioner's recommendation. 
The Peuler Affidavit makes it clear as to what her usage 
was in implementing Rule 8(d); her minute entry makes it clear 
that the rule was complied with by the undersigned, and she so 
noted in her minute entry. Counsel for the plaintiff cannot now 
be heard to say he didn't hear it. He is charged, in short, with 
notice of what transpires in open court, and this is true whether 
the transcribed incomplete and imperfect record discloses the same 
or not. 
Furthermore, when plaintiff's counsel thereafter, as 
part of the preparation for an evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Frederick, answered defendant's Interrogatories, without 
objection, he clearly demonstrated that he had heard and 
understood that defendant had not accepted the recommendation of 
the Commissioner. If defendant's counsel had not in open court 
rejected the recommendation, why else would counsel for plaintiff 
go to the unnecessary trouble of answering Interrogatories? He 
answered the Interrogatories because he clearly knew that 
defendant had rejected the Commissioner's recommendation. When 
the time came for the hearing before Judge Frederick, counsel for 
plaintiff argued the requirement for a written notice, which 
argument was apparently convincing to Judge Frederick. The 
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argument was clearly without merit and was thereafter abandoned, 
but not until it had misled Judge Frederick. Judge Frederick made 
his ruling, it would appear, based upon the lack of a written 
objection which he supposed was required, not because of any lack 
of oral objection. 
At the hearing, counsel for plaintiff stated to Judge 
Frederick that the Rules of the Third District Court required that 
the rejection be in writing. Judge Frederick did not adjourn or 
take time out on the bench to read the rules, but apparently 
relied on the representation of counsel for plaintiff that the 
rule contained such a requirement and accordingly ruled forthwith 
from the bench. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL HAD ACTUAL OR 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE, OR BOTH, OF DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT 
COMMISSIONER PEULER'S RECOMMENDATION. 
To further buttress the above argument the record 
discloses that on the fifth day following the hearing before 
Commissioner Peuler counsel for defendant served on counsel for 
plaintiff Interrogatories (R.136) which plaintiff answered in due 
course and about which more will be said hereafter. It would seem 
patent to any inquiring, objective mind that being served 
Interrogatories would serve no useful purpose unless defendant did 
not consent to the recommendation of the Commissioner. If he had 
indeed consented, there would be no need for discovery. 
Interrogatories would have no purpose except understood in the 
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context that defendant rejected the Commissioner's recommendation. 
We submit that treating those Interrogatories as actual 
constructive or implied notice would satisfy any requirement for 
written notice within five daysf even if there were such a 
requirement. This Court has always looked to substance rather 
than to form only, and we respectfully submit that there was 
substantial compliance under any theory of the case. Rule 1(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the rules be 
"liberally construed," and certainly that requirement must apply 
equally to local rules or its purpose would be thwarted. 
POINT III. AT THE INITIAL HEARING COMMISSIONER PEULER 
HERSELF STATED THAT IF THERE WERE APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NO LONGER BOUND ON THE MORTGAGE IN QUESTION, SHE 
MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO RULE OTHERWISE, AND IN THE SAME RULING FROM 
THE BENCH COMMISSIONER PEULER HERSELF STATED THAT A FURTHER 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING APPEARED TO BE NECESSARY IN THIS MATTER. 
In announcing her recommendation Commissioner Peuler 
made two crucial statements. The first is as follows: 
"I think that perhaps if she [the plaintiff] had 
sold the home outright and relieved herself of that 
mortgage obligation, I might be persuaded the outcome 
may be different; but it's my belief that as long as 
she's obligated on those mortgage payments, that he 
should continue to comply with the requirements of the 
divorce decree . . . " (R.238-239) 
Counsel for plaintiff, in making his statement of 
proffer to the Commissioner at the outset of the hearing, had 
represented as follows: 
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"In 1982, the plaintiff sold the house, but it was 
sold on contract, and she's still liable to the bank on 
the first mortgage and second mortgage, she still has to 
pay those things, and they're being paid through an 
escrow agent. Also, I think if the bank ever determines 
that it was sold that way, they have the right to 
require the whole payment to be due on it, so she is 
still liable on that and still may be required to pay 
the whole thing; and furthermore she doesn't have the 
money. She got a little money when she sold the house 
as a down payment and she put that into a condominium in 
St. George where she moved. 
"Now because the defendant refused to make the 
payments to her after a while, after she got the 
condominium, she had to lose that condominium and she 
now has absolutely nothing in the way of property." 
(R.231-232) (Emphasis added) 
The foregoing is something less than a full diclosure to 
the Commissioner as to what the real evidence on the issue would 
be, and we call this court's attention to the addendum attached to 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract appearing in the Addendum to this 
Brief at page 15 where it clearly states that the buyer, one Jose 
N. Roco, gave the plaintiff a hold-harmless agreement beginning at 
major paragraph 2 of said addendum as follows: 
"It is hereby understood and agreed that a non-
alienation and/or non-assumption provision is contained 
in the underlying deed of trust in favor of Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan as beneficiary, and that 
pursuant to the terms of said provision, the execution 
of this contract by the seller may be deemed a violation 
and breach. It is hereby agreed that should the lender 
seek those remedies available (including acceleration of 
the remaining unpaid loan balance and/or escalation of 
the original loan interest rate to current interest 
rates) the buyer shall have the obligation to do one of 
the following: 
"A. Obtain adequate refinancing or loan proceeds 
sufficient to repay the remaining contract balance or 
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"B. Affirmatively negotiate with Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan, to derive an acceptable increase in 
interest rate." 
It appears therefore that plaintiff's buyer has given 
plaintiff a hold-harmless agreement and has taken over plaintiff's 
obligation on said first mortgage. It is also to be noted that 
the two immediately preceding paragraphs of the same document 
obligate the buyer to increase the mortgage payments at Deseret 
Federal in the event of an interest rate change or an increase in 
property taxes and insurance premiums (Addendum, page 15). 
Moreover, in Answers to the Interrogatories filed after 
the hearing in front of Commissioner Peuler the plaintiff alleged 
under oath that she received $30,000 as the down payment from the 
buyer of her home and that she receives $188.19 per month to apply 
on her equity over and above the mortgage payments that were 
assumed by the buyer (see Addendum to this Brief, pages 4 and 5). 
She further responded in her Answers to Interrogatories that her 
down payment on the condominium purchased in St. George was $1,000 
(Addendum, page 6). That is a substantial departure from the 
representations of her counsel before Commissioner Peuler. At 
least to the undersigned $30,000 is a far cry from the "a little 
money," only $1,000 of which she "put into a condominium in St. 
George." (Addendum, pages 4-6) 
Had the undersigned been able to develop the above facts 
before Commissioner Peuler, she may very well have made the 
opposite recommendation. Defendant should have been able to 
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present these facts in evidence before Judge Frederick for a 
ruling on the merits. Judge Frederick never reached the merits, 
having erroneously disposed of the case on a procedural matter. 
The second crucial statement from the Commissioner in 
connection with giving her recommendation followed a question of 
plaintiff's counsel in which he attempted to ask the Court to 
impress a mortgage on the rental unit in Evanston awarded by the 
Decree to the defendant, to which the Commissioner responded that 
since she didn't know what the liabilities on that rental unit 
were at the time of the Decree, nor what was due and owing on it 
as of the time of the hearing in front of her, she didn't know 
that she could comply with that request. Counsel for plaintiff 
agreed. Then Commissioner Peuler said: 
"And I think—well, what I was going to say, is 
that I think it is going to take some further action 
before the court can make a determination." 
To which counsel for plaintiff agreed by responding: 
"I think you are right." (R.240) 
The only reasonable conclusion to be reached from that 
exchange is that the Commissioner viewed this matter as one that 
was going to need an evidentiary hearing and that further 
testimony and facts had to be developed, which is only consistent 
with the position of the defendant that the Commissioner and all 
others in open court had been told that the Commissioner's 
recommendation had been rejected by the defendant and that 
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further proceedings, evidentiary in nature, would have to be had 
before Judge Frederick, 
POINT IV. JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER MISCONSTRUED RULE 
8(d) AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION BY COMMISSIONER PEULER AS REFLECTED IN 
HER AFFIDAVIT. 
While Judge Frederick's initial judgment following the 
hearing on October 1, 1984, was entered without the benefit of the 
Affidavit from Commissioner Peuler, the clear language of Rule 
8(d) as quoted above contains nothing in it requiring that 
objections or nonconcurrence with the Commissioner's 
recommendation be in writing, which appears to be the basis on 
which the Court below entered its judgment. That would appear to 
be dispositive of that issue. 
The clear written entry in the Minute Entry would 
fulfill any requirement of a rejection in writing in any event. 
Acts done in open court by way of stipulation, admission or other 
representations by counsel on behalf of clients are binding on 
counsel and the client independent of any written embodiment of 
the same, and that has been the case in this state for as long as 
the undersigned have been practicing law. As noted earlier 
counsel for plaintiff has now abandoned his earlier position. Nor 
indeed does counsel for plaintiff assert that he has been 
prejudiced by the form of defendant's rejection. Rather, he is 
asking to be allowed to sneak in a judgment without ever having to 
produce evidence in support thereof. 
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POINT V. JUDGE FREDERICK'S JUDGMENT WITHOUT ALLOWING AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING EXCEEDS AND MODIFIES THE RECOMMENDATION OF 
COMMISSIONER PEULER. 
Although defendant's prior arguments are believed to be 
dispositive of this appeal, the undersigned wish to call the 
Court's attention to the fact that Judge Frederick's order entered 
November 20, 1984, allows the Judgment in favor of plaintiff to be 
$8,411 (R.148) and awards a $150 attorney's fee to plaintiff's 
attorney (R.149). Even though he was purporting to do nothing 
more than adopt Commissioner Peuler's recommendation, which 
recommendation as quoted above contained no dollar amounts and no 
award of fees. 
Counsel for plaintiff filed an affidavit October 19, 
1984, claiming a reasonable attorney's fee of $1,700 (eighteen 
days after the hearing before Judge Frederick). (R.143-145) There 
was neither any discussion nor presentation of evidence in front 
of Judge Frederick on the matter of fees. Accordingly, Judge 
Frederick's judgment exceeds in at least those two particulars the 
Commissioner's recommendation. 
Far more serious, however, is paragraph 2 of the Order, 
which does not spell out dollar amounts, but nonetheless orders 
the defendant to give the plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed on 
the Evanston property "in the amount of the first mortgage" on 
plaintiff's house at 4612 Belmour Way. (R148-149) That was the 
very issue that Commissioner Peuler refused to rule on and did not 
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make a recommendation on because she did not have sufficient 
evidentiary facts nor proffers. At that hearing counsel for 
plaintiff agreed with the Commissioner. Now, before Judge 
Frederick, without any evidence, he presumes to put in Judge 
Frederick's order the very thing that Commissioner Peuler was 
unwilling to do and which he agreed should not be done. 
POINT VI. THERE IS, EVEN IN THE ABBREVIATED RECORD 
BEFORE THIS COURT, SUFFICIENT FACTUAL MATERIAL THAT WOULD SUGGEST 
THAT THE OPPOSITE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT HAD THERE BEEN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND REQUIRES AT THE 
VERY LEAST THAT IN FAIRNESS AND EQUITY AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
SHOULD BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT. 
The evidence referred to in this point has already been 
alluded to in Point III above, and while not exhaustive, should at 
least demonstrate that there is a substantial dispute as to the 
facts that would give rise to justifying an order or judgment's 
being entered in this matter against the defendant without having 
had a chance to produce evidence before a fact-finding body. Such 
a result flies in the face of all principles of fair play, as well 
as the rules of this court and of the other courts of this state, 
all of which are designed to permit every litigant his full day in 
court. 
POINT VII. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMISSIONER PEULER 
AS ADOPTED BY JUDGE FREDERICK ARE ERRONEOUS IN ANY EVENT. 
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The errors heretofore alleged in this Brief by the 
defendant go mainly to the proposition that defendant has never 
had his day in court. However, even if this Court should conclude 
that the defendant has had his day in court, the result reached by 
the District Court is in any event erroneous. The Decree of 
Divorce required that the defendant make certain mortgage payments 
on the family home which the Decree awarded to the plaintiff. As 
noted above, after the Divorce Decree was entered the plaintiff 
sold the home and the new buyer assumed the indebtedness for the 
mortgage. That appears to be dispositive of the matter. The 
Divorce Decree did not require that the defendant pay plaintiff 
the said mortgage payments, but rather that he pay the holder of 
the mortgage. Plaintiff has never alleged that she paid the 
mortgage and is entitled to reimbursement. She has not made that 
allegation and indeed she could not because she did not make the 
mortgage payments on the house. They were made by the new buyer. 
There has been no modification of the Decree ordering that the 
defendant make any payments whatever to the plaintiff, and it 
cannot be supposed that the trial court intended that defendant 
make payments to the holder of a mortgage which would only benefit 
some third party. When plaintiff sold the home and the debt was 
assumed by a third-party buyer, the provision in the Divorce 
Decree relating to payment of that mortgage was satisfied and 
terminated. 
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Finally, we desire to point out to the Court that the 
Decree does not state whether or not the order for payment of the 
first mortgage was intended to be in the nature of alimony or in 
the nature of a property settlement. Commissioner Peuler made no 
finding or recommendation as to whether the claimed arrears was 
alimony or property settlement. Judge Frederick permitted no 
evidentiary hearing and merely adopted the recommendation of the 
Commissioner, yet his Order for the first time purports to refer 
to the alleged arrears as "property settlement." There was no 
evidence ever allowed into the case to support that finding and no 
recommendation with regard thereto, and that finding is thus 
erroneous in any event. 
Going beyond that, however, this Court has held that how 
a particular award is designated in the decree is not 
determinative of whether it is in the nature of alimony or a 
property settlement. In Erickson v. Beardall, 20 Ut 2d 287, 437 
P2d 210 (1968), this Court held at page 289: 
" . . . that it is the duty of the court to look to 
substance rather than to form. This is especially true 
where rights and responsibilities with respect to the 
family relationship are being dealt with. . . . 
"It is shown that the plaintiff's means of support 
would have been inadequate without the provision of the 
decree that the defendant pay these obligations, and 
there is ample basis for the trial court's finding that 
this requirement was for her support and maintenance." 
In the instant case the plaintiff was only awarded $1.00 
per year as alimony denominated as such. The order to pay the 
first mortgage was for the obvious purpose of providing housing 
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for the plaintiff and the children of the parties. Normally in 
such a case the husband would be required to pay the wife alimony, 
from which the wife makes the house payment. The fact that the 
husband made the mortgage payment directly to the holder of the 
mortgage still had the net effect of providing support for the 
wife. Having the mortgage payment paid by defendant permitted the 
plaintiff's own earnings to be used in other areas of support such 
as food, clothing and the like. Since the plaintiff remarried 
prior to the accrual to the arrears referred to in plaintiff's 
Order to Show Cause, the award must be held to have terminated 
pursuant to Section 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
states as follows: 
"Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon 
the remarriage of that former spouse . . . " 
We therefore respectfully submit that if the order 
requiring the defendant to make payments on the first mortage is 
alimony, such alimony terminated prior to the accrual of the said 
arrearage. If, on the other hand, that determination cannot be 
made upon the record, defendant is at least entitled to have his 
day in court on this issue as the purported finding by the trial 
court that the payment of the mortgage was a "property settlement" 
provision was not the subject of the recommendation purportedly 
adopted by Judge Frederick and should be reversed and the parties 
given the opportunity to present evidence on the issue of the 
nature of the said mortgage payments. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that this Court reverse the judgment of the District Court 
anddirect entry of judgment for defendant as a matter or law, or 
at least remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing before a 
District Judge on all issues raised by the original Order to Show 
Cause brought by the plaintiff in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
- 2 5 -
Courts of the State of Utah; or that such a pretrial order be 
prepared before a final settlement conference or trial date is 
set. 
Rule 6 Jury Trials - Civil 
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah shall not apply 
in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(a) Cases will be set for jury trial only upon 
the filing of a written demand for jury trial and the payment 
of the required statutory fee deposited with the clerk of court 
witnin the time provided herein. Such written demand for jury 
trial and the payment of the required statutory fee must be 
filed no later than ten (10) days prior to trial or at sucn 
other time as the trial Jgdgjo_may_.nrdftr-J—The--court-may in its 
discreti"dn7~upon motion, order a trial by jury of any or all 
issues. 
Rule 7 Motions for Supplemental Proceedings 
Motions for supplemental proceedings will be set on 
the regular weekly supplemental proceedings calendar before a 
clerk of tne court. Counsel may alternatively schedule the 
matter to be heard before the judge assigned to the case on the 
assigned judge's regular law and motion calendar. 
Rule 3 Domestic Relations Commissioner 
(a) A Domestic Relations Commissioner may be 
appointed for the purpose of assisting the court in domestic 
relations matters as directed by the court. 
(b) All domestic relations matters, including 
orders to show cause, pretrial conferences, petitions for 
modification of a divorce decree, scneduling conferences, and 
all other applications for relief, except ex parte motions, 
shall be referred to the Domestic Relations Commissioner before 
any hearing may be scheduled before the assigned District Court 
Judge, unless otherwise ordered by the assigned judge. 
(c) The Commissioner shall, after hearing any 
motion or other application for relief, recommend entry of an 
order thereon, and shall further make a written recommendation 
as- to each matter heard. Should the parties not consent to the 
recommended order, the matter shall be referred for further 
disposition by the assigned judge. 
(d) Any party objecting to the recommended order 
or seeking further hearing before the assigned judge shall, 
within five (5) days of the entry of the Commissioner's 
recommendations provide notice to the Commissioner's office and 
opposing counsel that the recommended order is not acceptable 
or that further hearing is desired. The Commissioner shall 
then^refer the matter to the assigned judge for further 
hearing, conference or trial. If no objection or request for 
further hearing is made within five (5) days, said party shall 
be deemed to have consented to entry of an order in conformance 
with the Commissioner's recommendation. 
(e) All recommendations of the Commissioner 
accepted by the parties shall be presented to the court and 
opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 4 of these Rules. All 
proposed judgments, orders and decrees must be approved as to 
form by the signature of the Commissioner before presentation 
to rne a Signed judge in the case. 
(f) Any party obtaining a temporary restraining 
order or other temporary order pending a hearing shall be 
responsible for obtaining from the assigned judge any extension 
v_nereof before the expiration date as may be necessary pending 
hearing before the Commissioner of the assigned judge. 
Rule 9 Probate 
(a) The probate calendar will be assigned to 
a District Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rotating 
assignment basis each January and July 1. 
(b) Pursuant to Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
Sections 75-1-201 and 75-1-307, the juage assigned to the 
probate division of the Third Judicial District Court is 
appointed registrar to act in that capacity as required 
(c) The probate clerk pursuant to Section 
75-1-401, Utah Uniform Probate Code is grantea authority to 
order and schedule dates for hearing and to prepare the probate 
calendar of matters to be heard by the judge assigned to the 
probate division of the court 
(d) Pursuant to Sections 75-1-102(1) and 
75-1-102(2) Utah Uniform Probate Code, the probate clerk is 
authorized to use the signature stamp of the assigned probace 
judge on informal matters presented to the court for handling 
Rule 10 Adoptions 
(a) The adoption calendar will be assigned to a 
District Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rotating 
assignment basis each January and July 1. 
(b) Pursuant to Section 78-30-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, pertaining to a request by the 
court for the Division of Family Services to verify the 
petition and conduct an investigation in adoptions, the 
petitioners shall, sixty (60) days or more prior to the hearing 
on the adoption unless such period is waived by the assigned 
judge, file with the court a motion and order either requesting 
an investigation or waiving an investigation If a motion is 
filed to waive the investigation, an affidavit shall be filed 
by the petitioners setting forth the following information 
pertaining to the petitioners (1) name, (2) place of 
residence for the last five years, (3) age, (4) marital status, 
including all prior marriages, (5) dependent children, (6) 
information on ownership of home, (7) employment within last 
five years, (8) average income for the past year, (9) where and 
how the child was placed with petitioners, (10) information on 
natural parents, (11) other pertinent information. 
(c) All petitioners and/or counsel shall certify 
no later than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing date 
AARON ALMA NELSON 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE, 
Defendant. 
) ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
) Civil No. D79-2603 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of \jJ^{CK ) 
Plaintiff answers defendant's Interrogatories as follows: 
1. Following the Decree of Divorce entered in the above-
entitled action June 23, 1981, how long thereafter did you 
continue to reside in the family home at 4 612 Belmour Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah? 
ANSWER: Two months. 
2. On what date did you move from said residence? 
ANSWER: September 5, 1981. 
3. Did you list said home for sale? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
4. When was said home sold? 
(a) For what price? 
Addendum 3 
(b) On what terms? 
(c) How much was the down payment? 
(d) What is the name (names) of the buyers? 
(e) Was said home conveyed to buyer by uniform 
real estate contract, deed and mortgage or trust deed? 
(f) Was there any escrow account established for 
the payment of the underlying mortgages? 
(g) What arrangements were made with regard to 
those mortgages and payment thereof? 
(h) What grace period was provided for the buyer 
in the event of default? 
(i) What notice of the sale did you give to the 
lending institutions holding the mortgages? 
(j) Who has made the payments on both mortgages 
from that date to the present? 
(k) What monthly payments have you received over 
and above the mortgage payments from the sale of that home? 
(1) What total amount of consideration have you 
received to apply on your equity in the home from the time of 
sale to the present? 
(m) How much is attributable to interest in that 
total sum received on your equity? 
ANSWER: The home was sold on contract on June 30, 1982. 
a. $110,000. 
b. Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
c. $30,000. 
Addendum 4 
d. Jose N. Roco. 
e. Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
f. Yes. 
g. Escrow agent makes payment to Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan. 
h. Thirty days. 
i. None. 
j. Alder-Wallace, Inc., as escrow agent for RoseMary 
T. Siggard. 
k. $188.19 per month, excepting a six-month period of 
time, at which time it was necessary to pay $124.0 5 in late charges 
accrued because of defendant's late payments before the divorce. 
During this six-month period of time, the amount received was 
approximately $167.00 per month. 
1. None, other than established monthly payment. 
m. Unknown• 
5. Did you purchase a condominium in St. George, Utah? 
(a) What was the date of such purchase? 
(b) What was the purchase price? 
(c) On what terms? 
(d) How much did you pay down? 
(e) From whom did you buy said condominium? 
(f) Was it on a contract or deed and mortgage or 
trust deed? 
(g) How many monthly payments did you make on the 
purchase of said condominium? 
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Addendum 5 
(h) If you defaulted, when did you so default? 
(i) Did you move from said condominium? 
(j) If so, when? 
(k) Did you rent that condominium? 
(1) If so, on what terms? 
(m) For what time period? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
a. May 15, 1982. 
b. $79,000. 
c. $1,000 down payment and assumption of First Trust 
Deed at Zions First National Sank in the amount of $46,321.75 
and Second Trust Deed to Nixon & Nixon, Inc., in the amount of 
$31,994.13. 
d. $1,000. 
e. Mixon & Nixon, Inc. 
f. Contract, 
q. 23. 
h. Not applicable, 
i. Yes. 
j. June, 1983. 
k. Yes. 
1. $350 per month and $60 per month homeowners fees, 
m. Month-to-month for one year. 
6. Did you remarry? 
(a) To whom? 
(b) When? 
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Addendum 6 
(c) Did you move into your second husband's home? 
(d) Where is it located? 
(e) When did you move? 
(f) Were the children of the marriage to Mr. Wiscombe 
with you at all material times that you resided at Salt Lake 
City, at the condominium in St. George, and at the home of your 
second husband? 
(g) Where do you presently reside? 
(h) Are the children still residing with ycu in that 
location? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
a. Richard Siggard. 
b. May 18, 1983. 
c. No. Home was purchased at 'cime of marriage. 
d. St. George, Utah. 
e. June, 198 3. 
f. Yes. 
g. 36 37 Pomegranate Way, St. George,-Utah, 
h. Yes. 
7. Have you at any time made efforts at refinancing 
your contract of sale on the home in Salt Lake or cashing the 
same out? 
ANSWER: No. 
8. Have you made any efforts at any time to refinance 
your equity or purchase in the condominium in St. George? 
ANSWER: No. 
-5- Addendum 7 
9. What is the status of any foreclosure on the condominiun 
in St. George? 
ANSWER: None. Quit Claim Deed was given to original 
seller, Nixon & Nixon, Inc. 
10. What efforts have been made to avoid such foreclosure? 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 9. 
' i' • -
ROSEMARY, T. SIGGARD 
Plaintiff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this •/ " > day cf 
September, 1984. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: , hJ / / / 
My Commission Expires 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories 
this U^ day of ^ Cft-W(Uv, , 1984, to: 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary ^ 
-6- Addendum 8 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #7 77 
Attorneys for Defendant 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
5F 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Sandra Peuler, having been duly sworn upon her oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That she is over the age of 21 years, competent and 
makes this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. That she is the Domestic Relations Commissioner for 
the Third Judicial District Court and was acting as such on the 
9th day of August, 1984. 
3. That the usage in her courtroom, both before and 
since the adoption of Rules of Procedure for the Third District 
Court, and particularly as it relates to Rule 8(d), was and is 
that if a party in a domestic relations matter did not agree or 
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMISSIONER 
SANDRA PEULER 
Case No. 20333 
Addendum 9 
concur with the said Commissioner's recommended order, the party 
could so inform the Court at the time; or should such party wish 
additional time for deliberation before deciding, could do so at 
any time within five (5) days from the date of the hearing. Such 
notice or communication of disagreement or nonconcurrence has 
never been required by Commissioner Peuler to be submitted in 
writing. Frequently the nonconcurrence was announced in open 
court at the time the recommended order was announced, in which 
case such nonconcurrence would be noted in the minute entry for 
that date. Such a disagreement or nonconcurrence on the part of 
the defendant in the case of Wiscombe v. Wiscombe was made by 
counsel in open court and so noted on Commissioner Peuler's minute 
entry in that matter dated August 9, 1984, copy of which is 
annexed hereto as Exhibit A. 
SANDRA PEULER, COMMISSIONER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
December, 1984. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
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Addendum 10 
wuufiiiy ui odii L.aKe - aiaie OT uian 
KJ> 
~ff Plaintiff 
u). 
. Ujsvt^-^r^ 
Defendant 
CAS? NO: f)l9- ^LCc3 
J ^ 
°ype of hearing: Div. Annul, 
'resent: Pttf ^ ^ D e f t . _ _ 
>. Atty: 6>C^ < ? ^ | L ^ g < L ^ ^ ^ L / 
). Atty: „„£j * ^ V ^ ^ w IX 
Iworn & Examined: 
• l t f : _ _ Def t :_ 
Hhers: 
Supp. Order_ 
Summons, 
Waiver^ 
^ Q S C . (^ Other. 
Stipulation 
Publication 
D Default o l Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: _ 
Clerk: _ 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ 
f l
i& #.j?>&f*t-
<33&£22 
>RDERS: 
I Custody Evaluation Ordered 
J Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
] Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
"] Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
] Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office: 
= . Per Month 
Per Month/Year D Alimony Waived 
] Atty. fees to the. 
] Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
J Furnishings To: . Automobile To: 
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
Restraining Order Entered Against 
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
Divorce Gnnted To As 
Decree To become Final: • Upon Entry • 3-Month Interlocutory 
Forrr er Name of Is Restored 
Bdjed c i ^ a failure of Deft to aopear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft ' 
Ret- _ .. Bai* 
B is( i n ' 3., stiry-'a on of r:- t etr/e counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
c v
 "
l r
 »'<•* r ' . c i ' i ' i^ c — 'he same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
A 
.<
 : ^ ^ - ^ r v v 0 courcel/nwttoTTiTf-Ptemttff's counsel court-orders 
^^-^~^±^^2^^2!Lf^^^ ^^Jtr f-i'L-'-c cx^'C^. 
Addendum I I 
NOTICE OF EXISTING UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
36*38859 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to the terms and provisions 
of a certian Uniform Real Estate Contract dated June 30, 1982 which 
was heretofore duly executed and which now continues to be in full force 
and effect, the undersigned parties are the seller and buyer of the 
following described tract of land situated in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
CC**MENCING AT THE NORTHEASTERLY CORNER OF LOT 6, LOCUST GROVE, ACCORDING 
TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 31 "DEGREES EAST 66 
FEET TO THE SOUTHEASTERLY CORNER OF SAJD LOT 6, THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY 
ALCNG THE SOUTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT, 99 FEET; THENCE NORTH 31 DEGREES 
WEST 68 FEET; MORE OR LESS TO THE NORTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT 6, THENCE 
NORTH 60 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 30 SECONDS EAST TO A POINT SOUTH 54 DEGREES 
00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS WEST 62.17 FEET FROM THE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE 
NORTH 54 DEGREES 00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS EAST 62.17 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
(SE N . BOC6 
A * /C^cf' 
(Buyer) 
Jkfli^/Mi^^ &JUJJJWL_ . 
ywiSCQMBE (Seller) 
r 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 30th day of June , '19 82 , personally 
appeared before me ROSE MARY T. WISCOMBE, and JOSE N. ROCO 
the signer(s) of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
the y executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 6-6-85 
AiAl 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
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Addendum 12 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
"This is Q lega l ly b ind ing f o r m , if not ond*-< stood, seek corr.pe'ent adv ice . " 
I. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 3 0 t h day of . J u n e
 t A. D., 19.82 
hy and between ROSE MARY T . WISCQMBE _ . . . . 
hereinafter designated a* the Seller, and _.JOSE N * ***£) .. __ .. 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of . S a l t L a k e Cit&__ U t a h .._ 
-. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convoy to the buyer, 
and the bu\cr for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
•h* eounty'of .Salt^ Lake state of Utah, to-wit: 4612j3etoourJfay, aC j J«ah_J4117_ 
ADDRESS 
More particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEASTERLY CORNER OF LOT 6, LOCUST GRO/E, ACCORDING 
TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN TFIE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 31 DEGREES EAST 66 
FEET TO THE SOUTHEASTERLY CCBNER OF SAID LOT 6, THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY 
ALONG THE SOUTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT, 99 FEET; THENCE NORTH 31 DEGREES 
WEST 68 FEET; MORE OR LESS TO THE NORTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT 6, THENCE 
NORTH 60 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 30 SECONDS EAST TO A POINT SOUTH 54 DEGREES 
00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS WEST 62.17 FEET FROM THE POINT OF'BEGINNING; THENCE 
NORTH 54 DEGREES 00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS EAST 62.17 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
.1. Saiu MfyvrTBereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of QNF HUNDRED 
TEN THOUSAND AND N O / 1 Q 0 - ™ — - — ———----.----"-7-"--.. Dollars ($.110^.000^00 > 
pavalde at the office of Seller, his assigns or order a s_ ^ 4 ? S C t e d b y S e l l e r s 
strietl> within the following times, to-wit: THIRTY THOUSAND AND f&lQQ——-~
 {% 30, 0 0 0 . 0 0 . , 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ §0 f 0 0 0 . 0 0 . _ . shall be paid as follows: 
"SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF" 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 3 0 t h day <»f J u n e , 1 9 . 8 2 - . 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to ihe payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from _ .Junfi-.30f~.1982 - . — . _ . on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of TWELVE |H.r Cl.nt ( _ 1 2 . 0 0 <; ) fM.r annum. The Huyer. at bis option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is mode. 
f>. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the liuyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
G. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of DsseflTQft.„Fj6Qgral 
Savings and LoajVDeseret Federal Savings and Loan,
 wi th au unpaU1 balance of 
$^l#J68.9p/14 tOOg.J0qL_.f as of 5-1-82/5-1-82 
7. Seller represents that there arc no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following - N Q ^ E x e e p t l o n s ... _ ,_ 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exc<-ed TWELVE- "**"""""" percent 
( 1 2 . 0 0 ' ' , ) per annum ami payable in regular monthh installment.• ; provided that the .-igirregale monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the liuyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans arid mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Huycr agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
i>. If the liuyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of ibis aerreement aeainst said profntiy, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred b\ seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expense* necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly pa> merits and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Huycr agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of e\cry kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
No Exceptions 
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The Seller fu r ther covenants and agrees tha t be will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
\'2. The Buyer ag ree s to pay the general taxe< af ter _Jl2ITfi 3 0 # 1 9 8 2 
l.'l. The Buyer fu r ther ag rees to k»>cp all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not loss than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ 80, 000 ..00 _. 
and to ass ign said insurance to the Seller a> hi.^ intcroMs may appea r an.l to th-liv« r the insuiancc policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer .shall default in tne payment ol anv special «»r IMI I IKI ! laves. ;i.-..s.'ssiucnis or insurance 
p remiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his optica, pay said taxes , a ssessments and iM.-urauee premiums or ei ther 
ol" them, and if Seller elects so to do. rhen the Buyer agrees to ivpav the Seller up«»r- demand, all Mich sums so advanced 
and paid by htm, toge ther with in tores ' tin icon from date of payment of said .aim.; at the ra te <>l ^ of one percent per 
mouth until paid. 
|."i. Buyer agree? tha t he will not commit or -a-.ffer to lxi commit ted any v av.tc, -poil, or destn:ct ion in or upon 
said premises , and that he will main ta in said prcioises in good condition. 
III. In the event of a fai lure to comply with the t e rms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the s:»n,e shall become due. or within I n l K l x \ J U J ^lXy& thereaf ter , the 
Seller, at his option shall have the foil twieg a l te rna t ive remedies : 
. \ . Seller shall have the l igh t , upon failure of the Buyer tn remedy the default within five days af ter wri t ten notice, 
to IK* released from all obl igat ions in law and in equity to convey said pco|>erly, and all payments which have 
been made there tofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be foi foiled to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of Uie contract , ami the Buyer agrees tha t the Seller may a t his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first ami former es ta te , together with all improve-
ments and addi t ions made by the Buyer thereon, anil the said addit ions and improvements shall remain with 
the laud and become the proper ty of the Seller, tin Buyer becoming at once*a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may br ing fui t and recover judgement tor all delinquent ins ta l lments , including costs and a t torneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, a t bis option, from resor t ing 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event oi' a subsequent d e f a u l t ) : or 
t*. The Svller shall have the r igh t , a t his option, and upon wri t ten notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder a t once due and payable, ami may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage , and pass 
t i t le to the Buyer subject there to , and proceed immediately to fore-, lose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the S t a t e of Utah, and have the proper ty sold and the proceeds applied to the Payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and a t t o rney ' s fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any.deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder , upon the filing of i complaint , shall IM- immediately enti t led to 
the appo in tmen t of a receiver to ttk>- possession of said mor tgaged proper ty and collect the rents , issues and 
prof i ts therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder , or bold the same pursuan t 
to order of the cour t ; and the Seller, upon en t ry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises dur ing the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed t ha t t ime is the essence of this ag reement . 
l>. In the event there a rc any liens or encumbrances agains t said premise - other than !ho-c herein provided for or 
referred to. or in the event any liens or cncu 'nbrancc* other than herein provided for shall hereaf ter accrue aga ins t the 
same !•> ac ts or neglect of the Seller, then the B o w r may. at In - option, pay and discharge the same and receive, credit 
on th;« amount then remain ing due hereunder in the amount of any * licit payment or payments and thereaf ter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, m a \ , at the option of the B-iver. be Mi-peiidcd until such a lime as such suspended 
p a y m e n t s shal l equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
It*. The Seller on receiving the pavmeuts herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or ass igns , a good and sufficient \\ a r rant v «leed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of ali i n< unibrancc- except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by oi t h rough the acts or neglect of the Bu \e r . and to furnish at bis expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
o'" the purchase price or a t the option of the Seller, an abs t rac t brought to date at time of sale or at any lime dur ing the 
t rn »f this a g r e e m e n t , or at t ime of deliver) o( deed, at the op' ion of Buyer. 
jo . It i« hereby express ly understood and agreed by the par t ies hereto that the Buyer a d e p t s the said property 
in i t- present condition and that there are no represen ta t ions , covenants , or ag reemen t s between the part ies hereto with 
n-lVn nee to said proper ty except a^ herein specifically set forth or at tached hereto N ° E x c e p t i o n s , 
of the covenants or agreements contained here 
reasonable a t to rney ' s fee, which may arise 
: i . The Buyer and Seller each agree tha t -hould they default in any 
in. tha t the defau l t ing par ty shall pay all costs and expenses, including 
or a« i rue from enforcing this ag reemen t , or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedv nrovided hereunder or by the s t a tu t e s of the S ta t e of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or o therwise . 
J*_\ It is understood tha t the s t ipula t ions aforesaid a re to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, adminis t ra tors , suc-
cessor.--, and assrgns of the respect ive par l ies hereto. 
IN W I T N E S S W H E K E O F , the sa 'd par t ies to this a g r e e m e n t have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
fir.-d above wr i t t en . 
S igner in the presence of 
li-^jLit\J!L£JUJ-£ L(.'>.iUM/><_, 
•p ' A , ^ 1 ' t 
Buyer 
o 
B 
CD 
© 
C 129 
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ADDENDUM TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONITOCT 
DATED: June 30, 1982 
BUYERS; JOSE N. RQCO 
SELLERS; ROSE MARY T. WISCCMBE 
A. The unpaid contract balance of $ 80,000.00 shall be paid 
as follows: ^ „
 vi 
1. The sum of $ 958.00 shall be paid to Seller on or before 
the 30th day of July , 198__, and the sum of 
$ 958.00 shall be paid to Seller on or before the 30th 
day of each succeeding month thereafter until June^l992 
^ , at which tine the total unpaid balance 
together with interest accrued thereon at TVELVE—•— 
PERCEm* (12.00 % ) , shall be paid in full. 
The sum of $ 822.90 being the monthly principal and interest 
amount, $ 91.10 of said payment to be applied toward the 
general property taxes, $ 39.00 to be applied toward 
the hazard insurance, and" $ 5_00 of said payment to be 
applied toward the monthly contract collection service fee to 
Alder Wallace * . 
2. It is understood and agreed that as Seller's monthly payments 
to Deseret Federal Savings and Loan _________________ 
increase or decrease for general property taxes and hazard 
insurance premiums, the Buyer's monthly payment to Seller shall 
increase or decrease accordingly. It is further understood 
and agreed that Buyer shall pay to Seller a late charge 
identical to that late charge assessed by said lender in 
the event Buyer's monthly payment should exceed 10 days 
past due. (Said late charge being 4% of payment) 
3. It is hereby understood and agreed that should the underlying 
lender, Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
increase the interest rate of said Trust Deed Note secured by 
Trust Deed, the Buyer shall accordingly increase interest to 
the Seller in the amount equal to the increase in the monthly 
payment required by the escalation of interest rate. 
It is hereby understood and agreed that a non-alienation and/or non-
assumption provision is contained in the underlying Deed of Trust in 
favor of Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
as Beneficiary, and that pursuant to the terms of said provision, the 
execution of this contract by the Seller may be deemed a violation and 
breach. It is hereby agreed that should the lender seek those remedies 
available (including acceleration of the remaining unpaid loan balance 
and/or escalation of the original loan interest rate to current interest 
rates) the Buyer shall have the obligation to do one of the following: 
A. Obtain adequate refinancing or loan proceeds sufficient to repay the 
remaijung contract balance or 
B. Affirmatively negotiate with Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
, to derive an acceptable increase in interest 
rate* 
Buyer and Seller do hereby hold Associated Title Company and all real 
estate agents related to this transaction liarmless and free of any and 
all liability, or damages which may result from closing this contract 
sale in violation of said non-assumption/non-alicnation provision. 
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ADDENDUM TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
DATED: June 30, 1982 
BUYERS; JOSE N. ROCO 
SELLERS: ROSE MARY T. W1SCCMBE 
Page 2 
3. Simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement an Escrow and Contract 
Collection Account shall be established at Alder Wallace: 
snnn <foit-h 900 East. Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escrow Agent") and said Escrow Agent shall: 
A. Receive all payments due to Seller from the Buyer as provided in this 
Contract; 
B. Pay all the present underlying obligations and encumbrances listed in 
Paragraph 6 hereinabove and such new obligations as may be incurred by 
the Seller pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of said Contract; 
C. Pay the remaining balance of the Buyer's payments to the Sellers. 
4. Similtaneously with the execution of this Agreement,"the Seller shall deliver 
to said Escrow Agent a duly executed Warranty Deed conveying the subject 
property to the Buyer's free and cloar of all encumbrances with the exception 
of those encumbrances which may have accrued by or through the acts or 
neglect of the Buyer and/or those encumbrances assumed by the Buyer pursuant 
to Paragraph 6 hereinabove. Said Escrow Agent shall deliver to Euyer or 
assigns, said Warranty Deed upon receiving the final payment from Buyer as 
provided herein or upon the Buyer's assumption of the underlying encumbrances 
pursuant to the provision of Paragraph 6 hereinabove. 
5. It is further agreed should Buyer sell or convey subject property, the 
remaining Seller's equity shall be due and payable together with interest 
accrued thereon at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12.00%) per annum. 
J(6^ E N. RQOO BuYei- ROSE MARY fTwiSOQMBE Seller 
Buyer " Seller 
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AARON ALMA NELSON 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAgT *"5r. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
13 00 Continental Bank Building. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
B'L* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D79-2603 
Judae: 
State of Utah ) 
County of {,/rJ,;,r>f „ ) 
ss. 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE SIGGARD, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. Affiant is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled 
action on June 21, 1981, Defendant was required to pay the first 
mortgage on Plaintiff's house at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, having a balance of approximately $52,800.00 and 
monthly payments of approximately $578.00, as property settle-
ment. 
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3. The actual amount of the monthly payments on said first 
mortgage on the property is $583.00. 
4. Although demand has been made by Plaintiff upon Defen-
dant for such payments, Defendant is presently in arrears on 
said payments in the sum of $6,662.00 and Defendant continues 
to fail and refuse to make said payments. 
5. The Decree of Divorce further required that Defendant 
execute and deliver to Plaintiff a mortgage or Trust Deed on 
the real property awarded to Plaintiff at 12 01 Sage, Evanston, 
Wyoming, in the amount of the first mortgage on Plaintiff's 
house at 4 612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant has 
failed and refused to deliver said Trust Deed. 
DATED chis CX day of \ _c , 1984. 
/ 
/ ', / / / 
', > / ' ', * ' ,,V-<_ - \' ;<-/ •'' 
ROSEMARY/WISC0M3E SIGGARD /' / ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this H 6 day of 
t , 1984. 
/ / 
11 ' / ' • • • ' / > ; • • ' . M ; : ( . . ' . 
NOTARY" PUBLIC ~ 'x J 
Residing at , //* £{ y , 7, /,/ 
My Commission Expires: 
-J i t . . ' ' \i ': J LLLiE 
Addendum Id 
_ o _ 
*
:
*l E0 llir.F^S OFFlCS 
' <• • i 
AARON ALMA NELSON 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
JUL 30 S^fl i 'C' l 
I\I /..._. 
/jAMtfjfrlG^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT On SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE^ IARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE, 
Defendant. 
A/Oft /C£ 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D79-2603 
Judge: Dennis Frederick 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE: 
YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to appear before Commissioner Sandra 
Pueler at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on Thursday, August 9, 1984, at 3:00 p.m., 
to show cause, if any you have, why you should not be held in 
contempt of Court for wilfull failure and refusal to abide by 
the terms of the Decree of Divorce entered in the above-entitled 
Court, why judgment should not be entered against you for your 
failure to make the required payments set forth in the Affidavit 
of Plaintiff in support of Order to Show Cause, why you should 
not be ordered to pay Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees, 
and why you should not be sentenced for contempt of Court. 
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JLv*U 
DATED this .* ?3 day of vy'-.-r c c^ 
, 1984 
Serve Defendant: 
238 "B" Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HI 
By ~< V ^ * ''SM/r^—^ 
Deputy C&* it i4 
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GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE ] 
Defendant. ] 
! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
OF INTERROGATORIES 
1 Civil No. D-79-2603 
I certify that a copy of defendant's Interrogatories to 
plaintiff was mailed to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for the 
plaintiff, at his address, 1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, the S 4—day of 
August, 1984. ^~- * ^ 
\ /£GRDON A. MADSEN 
//Attorney for Defendant 
/ 
£OMJUM -/riatw*^ 
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nute Book Form 103 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
CAS->*-<3~<?-
Q. uJ^c 
Plaintiff 
^ n 
Defendant 
CASE NO: 009- 3-£?t>3 
Annul.. 
Deft. 
"ype of hearing: Div. 
'resent: Pltf..—--
'. Atty: Cfr ' c=—T" 
3. Atty: _Jt: * /7?1A<£<L*-* 
Jworn & Examinad: 
3itf: 
LS 
Supp. Order. A O S C . _ k ^ Other. 
Summons, 
Waiver. 
Stipulation. 
Publication. 
Deft: 
Dthers: 
D Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
D,.e: 2/r/*V
 7 r_i 
Judger C f f r w y • ^ > - h^JL^M'nS 
Clerk: / ^ — Q *c ^  g ^ v ^ ^ . 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ o..^^t"> 
ORDERS: 
G Custody Evaluation Ordered 
• Visitation Rights 
D Custody Awarded To 
p 
D 
n 
n 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Officer 
Atty. fees to the 
Hnmp To-
._ 
_ Per Month/Year 
_ in the amount of _ 
Per Month 
D Alimony Waived 
• Deferred 
G Furnishings To: 
G Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
G Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
G Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against 
Automobile To: 
• Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
G Divorce Granted To As 
G Decree To Become Final: G Upon Entry 
G Former Name of 
3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restore 
G Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, cou 
orders / shall issue for Deft 
Returnable. . Bail. 
G Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefc 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
3 " " Based on w>ittenT3apgtafoo of respective counsel/FTtetroTTtrfi^t^ w*6<* , * - ^ > ^ ^ > . 
^^-^-->n^ (-<* £<-•<$ 
•f-
r d ^ r?^<^^ •o &~<z~m.-^L~>£r r<L ^zZi^t^ 
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GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE 
Defendant. 
NOTICE 
Civil No. D-79-2603 
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY, AARON ALMA NELSON: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Order to Show Cause heard by 
Commissioner Sandra Peuler on August 9, 1984, has been referred to 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, judge of the above-entitled 
court, and is set for hearing on Monday, September 10, 1984, at 
the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
DATED the ^ / day of August, 1984. 
^/<L:s^rc~ 
s^ //f LJ. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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1, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certiiy that a copy of the foregoing Notice was mailed 
to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for the plaintiff, at his address, 
1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
postage prepaid, the * ^ 7 day of August, 1984, 
GORDON A. MAD SEN ^ \ 
Attorney for Defendant "^  
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AARON ALMA NELSON 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 364-3627 
TWoiiiciimomw 
SHTLAf £CWMrv.UT*H 
SET I I 6*3AH fM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. D79-2603 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Pursuant to Rule 3, Rules of Practice in the Third 
Judicial District Court, I hereby certify that on the 10th day of 
September, 19 84, Answers to Interrogatories were served by mail, 
on: 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this 10th day of September, 19 84. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
*-<*, s*-
-<£-
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MI 
AARON ALMA NELSON 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
13 00 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
Mi 19 1984 
H Dixon \fit\6l 
By U 
'dOlst.Ccjrt 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
& I'JtKV ,P^ 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT UPON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D79-2603 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
The order to show cause why Defendant should not be held in 
contempt of Court for failure to pay to Plaintiff monthly payments 
for property settlement and failure to execute and deliver to Plain-
tiff a mortgage or trust deed on the real property awarded to Defen-
dant duly came before Commissioner Sandra Pueler on August 9, 1984, 
at 3:00 p.m., pursuant to Rule 8 of the rules of this Court. Plain-
tiff appeared through her attorney, Aaron Alma Nelson, and Defendant 
appeared through his attorney, Gordon A. Madsen. After hearing the 
evidence and arguments by the parties, Commissioner Pueler entered 
her recommendations that Defendant be required to comply with the 
terms of the original Decree of Divorce and that Plaintiff be 
awarded judgment against Defendant for the amounts Defendant failed 
Addendum 26 
to pay to Plaintiff in property settlement under the Decree of 
Divorce. Commissioner Pueler further recommended that Defendant 
execute and deliver to Plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed on the 
real property awarded to Plaintiff, as required by the original 
Divorce Decree. 
The Order to Show Cause again came before this Court for 
hearing on October 1, 1984, at 10:00 a.m., upon notice filed by 
Defendant's attorney dated August 21, 1984. This Court deter-
mined that Defendant did not provide notice to the Commissioner's 
office and opposing counsel that the recommended Order is not 
acceptable or that further order is desired within five days of 
the entry of the Commissioner's recommendations, as required by 
Rule 8(d) of the rules of this Court. Defendant is therefore 
deemed to have consented to entry of an Order in conformance v/ith 
the Commissioner's recommendation, pursuant to said rule. 
On the basis of the ruling of Commissioner Pueler and Rule 8 
of the rules of this Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Defen-
dant for all unpaid property settlement payments under the Decree 
of Divorce, presently in the amount of $8,411.00, together with 
interest on each payment from the date payment was due at the 
legal rate. 
2. That Defendant is hereby ordered to deliver to Plaintiff 
a mortgage or trust deed on the real property awarded to Defendant 
-2-
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at 1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming, in the amount of the first mortgage 
on Plaintiff's house at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
requiied by the original Decree of Divorce. 
3. That Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Defendant 
in thj amount of $ ( S"Z), as a reasonable attorney's fee, 
together with costs incurred herein in the amount of $32.75. 
DATED th 
-4 day of , 1984 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
nS, C<—i^c6( ^"YQi Lcu/ex~ 
BY THE #OURT: 
Bv 
SANDkA PUELER 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER 
CJ&rk 
Deputy Cierk 
- 3 -
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1. _ 
^ 1 
'S 11 1GQ4 
f'lT'&v" ^ *- s* ^CLr* 
/ f D .p j t yCe .n . 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
1G 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISC0M3E, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMEE 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. D-79-2603 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 
19th day of November, 1984, before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, judge of the above-entitled court, on defendant's 
Objection to Judgment. Aaron Alma Nelson appeared for the 
plaintiff and Gordon A. Madsen appeared for the defendant. The 
Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's 
Objection to Proposed Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause is denied, 
DATED the AJ) day of November, 1984. 
BY THE tfOURT: 
AT 
*7V' 'IV 
im JO C> ,: 
Ifctf 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant was mailed to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for the 
respondent, at his address, 1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, the 4th day of November, 
1985. 
Attorney for Appellant 
